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Abstract. Doping has been an issue for the greater part of a century. Current anti-doping policies involve 
punishment and chemical testing aimed at a single individual. Doping scandals show that it is rarely the fault of 
only an individual athlete, particularly in a team scenario. Coaches, sports scientist and other athletes may all 
contribute to an athlete’s decision to dope. A novel solution has been formulated, a ‘pool of responsibility’; the 
idea that responsibility for doping is borne by all team-members not just the individual athlete. Case studies and 
examples from organisational and legal literature were used to justify the concept.
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There has been considerable debate for the better part of a century with regards to the most 
effective and effi cient manner in which to prevent doping. Early debate centred around 
penalties based on competition bans. These eventually formed the basis for the anti-doping 
systems used today, a system based on punishment (fi nes and bans) and restrictions. Yet, the 
problem of doping and ways in which to combat it remains to this day. There is still much 
debate, on exactly what can be done to prevent doping. Yet to this day the notion of a 
response through punishment persists, as has been seen in cases such as the ‘Festina Affair’ 
(Christiansen 2005), ‘Operation Puerto’ (Cycling News 2013), and the US Postal Cycling 
Team Investigation (USADA 2013a). In each of the above cases, and with many other 
major doping scandals, it was not only a single team member found to be doping, but rather 
it was a team-wide issue. In such situations it would seem logical to assume that additional 
external factors are involved in the decision to dope. These may be peer pressure, coach 
pressure, manager pressure, medical/scientifi c advice or just pressures of the sporting arena. 
If this is the case, then punishing only the athlete involved is not only unfair but also short-
sighted. Moreover, it can be said that this also works against the prevention of doping. The 
purpose of this paper is to propose a novel approach to anti-doping legislation; a new 
concept which takes into account the realities of group decision-making and the pressures 
on an individual’s decision to dope or not. This paper will present the concept termed ‘pool 
of responsibility’, the idea placing the responsibility of doping in a team on all members of 
the team. This will be explored through use of case study examples and arguments from 
legal and organisational sources. This paper will, begin with a background to the arguments 
for the existence of anti-doping legislation and a critical analysis of these arguments, so to 
better set the scene to present the concept.
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1. ANTI-DOPING ARGUMENTS: A CRITIQUE
It is prudent to begin with the underlying question: What is the point of anti-doping 
policies?
There are three primary arguments used to explain, and perhaps, to justify anti-doping 
policies; 1) fairness, 2) equality and 3) athlete health (WADA 2009). Yet, there is evidence 
that indicates that there are, in fact, two additional plausible explanations for the existence 
of anti-doping policies, they are 4) appearance and perceptions and 5) revenue. To begin, it 
is prudent to attempt to present and assess each explanation in order to provide an 
appropriate background to enable the presentation of the proposition of a ‘pool of 
responsibility’.
1.1. Fairness and Equality
First of all, there is the fairness argument. The notion is that the introduction of doping 
agents by only some athletes in the sporting arena would create a situation that means the 
remaining athletes are not able to compete in a fair playing fi eld. Each athlete should be 
able to compete without needing to dope and still be able to compete at the same level. 
However, the WADA Code (2009), UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport (2005) 
and the IOC fi ght against doping (2014), all fail to defi ne exactly what is meant by ‘fairness’ 
in sport. Nor do they apply the concept. It has been suggested by Lenk (1972) that in the 
context of sports, fairness takes on two different forms, ‘formal fairness’ and ‘informal 
fairness’. The former refers to athletes complying with the rules (letter of the law) and the 
latter refers to voluntary acts or sportsmanship (sprit of the law). Lumer (1995) defi ned it as 
‘the moral norm for sports’. However, Kuchler provides the most useful statement for 
fairness as applicable to sport. He states: 
 ‘[W]hich in the situation of agon takes the opponent as a partner, in contest keeps the 
sense of playfulness, pays attention to keeping the rules and to equal chances, does not 
value victory higher than anything else, gives the right attitude towards victory and 
defeat, spurs on to exerting all one’s energies, refuses dishonourable and unequal 
advantages, helps to overcome endured injustice, in all these situations and questions 
can decide generously and greatheartedly’ (Kuchler 1969: 156).
In each example there is a tendency to refer to intangibles and the true spirit of human 
morality and sport.
The second explanation is equality. The concept of equality is the right of all athletes 
to play on a level playing fi eld (Loland 2002; Kayser–Mauron–Miah, 2007), and, as such, 
the rules of sports are the means to this end. Rawls (1971) and Lenk (2007) both argue 
equality in a similar vein, and speak of ‘equality of opportunities’. Similarly, König (1995) 
uses the phrase ‘same chances to win’ when discussing equality in sport. These are all noble 
concepts, and no doubt, the various anti-doping policy creators had concepts like these in 
mind when forming the legislation. However, if one now assesses the realities of the 
fairness and equality in the actual sporting world, a very different view can be seen. 
Firstly, it has been suggested by Lumer (1995: 12) that if one were to use football as 
an example of the realities of fairness, then 
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 “[I]f sportsmen have (tacitly) agreed on competing for a prize under certain conditions 
which exclude fouls and if then one of them plays foul, thereby increasing his chance 
of winning, this is a form of fraud.”
But, as detailed by Pilz (1988), in professional football, deliberate fouls are universally 
considered necessary for victory. If a player does not engage in this practice, they are not 
considered to be good players, and, as such, fouling is actually a trained skill. Despite the 
fact that fouls are against the letter and spirit of the law, and are unfair, they still occur and 
are accepted by both players and spectators alike. Moreover, one can refer to athletes from 
developed nations versus developing or third world nations. It would be unfair to assert that 
all athletes have the same opportunities to compete, train and develop irrespective of the 
place of origin. Even if one discounts the effects of nutritional disadvantages during 
childhood development, there is still the issue of economic equality and access to the same 
facilities and resources upon becoming an athlete. Athletes from Nepal, for example, do not 
have the same opportunities to train and compete, or have access to the same level of 
coaching as athletes from the United States. Even in a less extreme case, an athlete from 
Slovenia (despite being a member of the European Union) may not be given the same 
opportunities to train nor have the same access to resources as an athlete from Great Britain. 
The reality is that sport is an economic endeavour and a business. It costs money to train 
and compete and not every country has the same resources available, nor does every country 
contribute the same resources to developing their national athletes. This also differs from 
sport to sport. For example, a rugby player from Austria would never have equal 
opportunities to become a world class player same as an athlete from New Zealand or even 
Ireland, especially if they wanted to remain in the home nation to develop. More specifi cally, 
and relating to doping, there is an inequality with regards to access to medicaments and 
pharmaceuticals. As has been demonstrated with USADA’s investigation (USADA 2012) 
into doping at US Postal as well as the development of Tetrahydrogestrinone (THG), 
athletes with direct access to pharmaceutical companies are at a signifi cant advantage. 
There is also the separation of female and male athletes, disabled and able bodied athletes 
and age segregation in sports. If a player is of equal skill, should it matter if they are male 
or female, young or old etc. should they not be allowed to compete without having to fi ght 
for that right? Under current sporting regulations in many sports, there are rules that restrict 
those which can compete in certain organised events. Cycling for example is separated into 
male and female tours (see Tour de France vs. le Tour de Femme). Furthermore, such 
realities are found in able and disabled competitions (see Olympics vs. Paralympics). To 
elaborate further, one can refer to the case of Oscar Pistorius, a disabled athlete who after a 
5 year fi ght, successfully won the right to compete with able bodied athletes in the Olympics 
(Moreton 2012). What is more, with the case of Pistorius, he was required to win the case 
to actually compete in sports at all due to his prosthetics legs (which some deemed to give 
him an unfair advantage) (Pistorius v. IAAF 2008). Another such example can be seen in 
the case of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2001). In this case the court found that the PGA could 
not exclude Casey Martin from golfi ng events due to his disability (a heart condition that 
prevented him from walking between holes). Furthermore, reasonable steps should be taken 
to ensure the inclusion of disabled athletes in able bodied events. Whilst in these examples 
the plaintiff successfully won the right to compete, there is still the issue that it is not 
automatically allowed. So the question remains: is this complying with the ideals of fairness 
and equality, let alone basic human rights?
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1.2. Athlete’s Health
The fi nal primary argument for the existence of anti-doping policies is the concept of 
athlete’s health. There have been numerous pieces of research that have demonstrated the 
harmful effects of certain substances used for doping (Beastall–Gibson–Martin–1995; 
Kohler–Thevis–Schänzer–Püschel 2008). Similarly, it is argued in each piece of anti-doping 
legislature, that one of the primary reasons for anti-doping policies is in order to protect the 
health of athletes due to the negative health effects of doping agents. There is signifi cant 
evidence demonstrating the harmful consequences of some doping products (Beastall–
Gibson–Martin 1995; Kohler–Thevis–Schänzer–Püschel 2008). There is little debate on the 
serious health side effects (including death) of well-established doping agents such as 
steroids (Kicman–Gower 2003; James–Gower 2004) and Human Growth Hormones 
(Bengtsson–Eden–Ernest–Odén–Sjögren 1988; Haupt 1993). However, there is still, some 
debate about exactly how harmful some doping agents truly are. There tends to be 
contradictory evidence in the cases of some banned doping agents as to whether they have 
the effects claimed. There is much debate about the inclusion/exclusion of some agents in 
the banned list (Korkia 1999). Some agents such as beta-2 Agonists would seem to not have 
the same negative health impacts on users. In fact many of the doping agents used by 
athletes today, and historically, originally were used for medical purposes, and many still 
have health applications. It seems that the problem, in many cases, is not the use of the 
medicaments but rather the abuse. This may have something to do with the apparent modern 
social phenomena of ‘popping pills’. It could be argued that, in the modern era, people may 
see pills as the cure for everything, and what is more, this carries over onto the apparent 
belief that ‘more is better’. For example, if one pill helps provide a 20% improvement then 
5 must provide a 100% improvement. It would seem that there is little sense that more is 
not always better, and so abuse occurs. Therefore, perhaps the source of some of the 
negative health issues are not the agents themselves but rather the type and style of usage. 
Moreover, there is the rather considerable debate about Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUE) 
(Kaufman 2005; Orchard–Fricker–White–Burke–Healey 2006). If the agents are banned 
(with the assumption that they are damaging for human health), then an athlete acquires a 
TUE are these agents still harmful? If so, then it is fi ne if the athlete is harmed, and if not 
then are they in fact not harmful, or only in some cases? One can refer to the before 
mentioned use of beta-2 Agonists as an example. It is a common agent for the management 
of asthma, yet it is also a banned substance. Numerous athletes use beta-2 Agonists to help 
with asthma (one such example being Alessandro Petacchi, who despite having a TUE was 
banned for ‘too much use’ of salbutamol). If this was harmful for human health, (which as 
outlined previously there is no evidence to support) why then is its use so widespread as a 
means to manage asthma in the general population? It seems more likely that the agent is 
not banned for health reasons but rather an uncertainty as to its performance enhancing 
possibilities. 
1.3. Appearances, Perceptions and Revenue 
There are two additional arguments to be discussed here, with regard to the existence of 
anti-doping policies. These are rarely considered but would seem to be almost as plausible 
as the primary justifi cations for the existence of anti-doping legislation. These arguments 
are appearance and perceptions, and revenue. These two concepts, whilst different, do 
indeed tie in with one another. 
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Appearance and perceptions refer to the idea that anti-doping, as it is currently 
structured and implemented, (chemical testing and punishment) is largely ineffective in so 
far as to actually be effective in detecting and subsequently eliminating doping. This is 
supported by researchers (Kayser–Mauron–Miah 2007) as well as offi cials, retired and 
banned athletes (Cycling News 2010a: 2012). As such, this raises the question: if this is the 
generally accepted belief now, then is the purpose of anti-doping simply to give the 
appearance of a fair, equal and honest competition? Do sporting offi cials and policy makers, 
knowing the ineffectiveness of anti-doping policies, only continue to use them so as to put 
the spectators’ minds at ease? To elaborate, one can refer back to the International 
Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) initial introduction of anti-doping in 1928 as 
well as the IOC’s fi rst anti-doping legislation. Both policies were introduced knowing that 
they did not have any testing available or at least no effective testing (WADA 2010). As 
such, one could say that the purpose of the legislation was twofold, 1) to try and scare 
athletes to not dope, and 2) to try to convince spectators that they should keep watching 
because the sports were ‘clean’. It can be argued that this also relates to the latter concept of 
revenue. If the aim of anti-doping is to simply give the impression of fairness, equality and 
honesty in the minds of spectators, is this simply to ensure continued viewership and thus 
sustainable revenue. Do sporting offi cials believe that spectators want some level of fairness 
in sports and without it they would simply turn off (it remains to be shown if this idea is 
true, do spectators even care?)? If this is the case, then perhaps it explains the inclusion of 
ineffective anti-doping policies.
2. ‘POOL OF RESPONSIBILITY’: A NOVEL APPROACH
There have been numerous opinions and differing ideas on what the best way to solve the 
doping problem is. Some have suggested simply increasing the penalties for doping (WADA 
2012), others have suggested that changes are needed in the psychology of the athletes 
(Petróczi–Aidman 2008; Ehrnborg–Rosen 2009; Hermann–Henneberg 2013). Others still 
have suggested that major changes are needed to the way in which sports are run and 
structured (Cycling News 2010; 2011). 
The fact that anti-doping testing is not working well with regards to effectiveness or 
rather as a deterrent is illustrated by WADA’s recent decision to increase the length of 
doping bans from 2 to 4 years (WADA 2012) with the aim of increasing the deterrent effect 
of the penalty. In law enforcement this practice is usually performed when detection of a 
wrongdoing is ineffective. Some research, however, has claimed that increasing the penalty 
of an infraction will have no impact on the criminal behaviour (Tsebelis 1990). There are 
some who doubt if this practice is even effective in criminal matters. As Arizona pitcher 
Brad Ziegler stated when discussing penalties for doping in sport, 
 “There are 32 states that have the death penalty for murder, and murders happen in 
those states every single day. It’s not going to stop people from committing the crime, 
even if you have a death penalty’’ (Ziegler 2014).
Does simply increasing the length of ineffective penalties truly work, there is much 
debate, but it would seem that in some cases the answer is simply no.
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2.1. The Concept
The solution being offered here has been termed the ‘pool of responsibility’. The suggestion 
here is that policy-makers should incorporate the notion of a ‘pool of responsibility’ at the 
national level. What this means is that accountability and responsibility for anti-doping 
initiatives would need to be taken by sporting organisations and athletes on a national level. 
Such responsibility would need to be borne not only by the athlete caught doping but would 
then need to be extended to include those directly associated with the athlete. This may 
include, but not be limited to, coaches, medical practitioners, teammates, sports scientists 
etc. This may, at fi rst, appear to be a somewhat controversial solution, especially given the 
historical events involving group responsibility. Yet similarly controversial legal doctrines 
have become commonplace throughout the world. One such example can be seen with the 
Market-share liability doctrine in US tort law (Geistfeld 2006).
Given the realities of the sporting world, it is diffi cult to demonstrate a specifi c case 
where the actions and decisions of an athlete are truly independent and without infl uence 
and involvement from others. Numerous studies have demonstrated that, when it comes to 
decisions with regard to doping by professional athletes, the decision is, to some extent, 
infl uenced by teammates, coaches and medical practitioners (Lentillon-Kaestner–Carstairs 
2010; Neeraj–Maman–Sandhu 2011; USADA 2012; Morente-Sanchez–Zabala 2013). As 
such, it would only be fair that if others are involved, responsibility should be shared by 
others, such as, teammates, coaches, medical practitioners and sports scientists to name but 
a few.
Exactly who is to be held accountable may differ from case to case, and as such any 
legislation would need to allow for such fl exibility in applying liability to other individuals. 
However, certain legal minimums of relationship to the accused, role in the accused 
decision to dope, role in the accused sporting life, infl uence ‘level’ and situation specifi cs 
about the doping would need to be determined before implementing any such legislation. 
With reference to this theme of relationship to the accused, it seems reasonable that 
this be taken into consideration when looking at doping cases and the ‘pool of responsibility’. 
More specifi cally, what if it can be shown that the athlete and the medical practitioner, 
sports scientist or coach had a particularly close relationship, one of trust? If the athlete 
relied upon the person (particularly a medical practitioner or sports scientist) when 
discussing supplements for ingestion, would it not be reasonable to expect that person 
knows what they are doing and would not provide the athlete with illegal substances. Under 
current anti-doping legislation the concept of strict liability applies the athlete needs to 
know what they are ingesting. It is well known that ignorantia legis neminem excusat 
(ignorance of the law is no excuse), but if the athlete, in a position of trust, reasonably 
relied upon the other, it would seem to be reasonable that the individual that betrayed that 
trust, at the very least, also be held liable for the decision of the athlete to dope.
2.2. The Organisational Arena
Such policies and practices are widely used throughout the global business world. It is not 
only common place to have systems of group responsibility incorporated into business 
operations but, in fact, it is arguably the preferential choice when it comes to organisational 
sustainability and success (Reed–Lemak–Meroc 2000; Curry–Kadasah 2002). These are not 
the only environments where one can see systems in place which require greater group 
responsibility; the military is another such example. Specifi cally one can refer to the concept 
of ‘Organizational Responsibility’ as coined by Crawford (2007: 198). This idea holds that 
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individuals in bureaucratic institutions such as the military do not act alone; there are others 
up the chain of command that are also involved. There have been numerous examples of 
scholars comparing sports to war (Dupre 1987; End–Kretschmar–Campbell–Mueller–Dietz-
Uhler 2003; Mangan 2003).
There are, however, further possible advantages to the introduction of a ‘pool of 
responsibility’. To further justify the concept of the ‘pool of responsibility’, one can refer to 
organisational literature. Numerous studies have shown the positive impacts group 
responsibility and accountability have on the decision-making and the overall productivity 
of teams and groups (Cohen–Ledford 1994; Guzzo–Dickson 1996). This is of importance 
for obvious reasons, the most obvious of which is productivity, which, in turn provides 
numerous benefi ts with regards to organisational success, which is a primary measure of 
performance in a sporting team. Furthermore, by extension, this is also a key determinate 
for staff retention and organisational sustainability. These studies demonstrate the 
importance of autonomous or self-managed teams and the role self-policing has had on 
positive group cohesion (Terborg–Castore–DeNinno 1976) and group norms (McGrath 
1984). Standing alone, the concepts of high group cohesion and strong group norms may 
re-enforce a doping culture. However, when these are moderated by group responsibility 
and accountability, the combination of these concepts may create an environment promoting 
ethical decision-making, thus reducing the likelihood of doping. This would need further 
investigation to determine if this reality could be realised in the sporting world as it is with 
the rest of the organisational world. Would it not therefore be feasible and reasonable to 
implement such policies in sports; each athlete would be required to share the responsibility 
to the group and to themselves. Given the arguments for the concept, the answer would 
appear to be yes. Moreover, the benefi ts of high group cohesion will provide avenues for 
improving and sustaining performance of the team. This approach would, on this argument, 
encourage greater desire on behalf of the sporting team to provide increased organisational 
support, in an attempt to prevent widespread ramifi cations of doping. The benefi ts of 
organisational support to the employee are vast but include aspects such as increased 
motivation (O’Driscoll–Randall 1999), loyalty/commitment (Shore–Wayne 1993) and 
performance (Randall–Cropanzano–Bormann–Birjulin 1999), all of which may aid in 
reducing an athlete’s willingness to dope for fear of group ramifi cations and loyalty/
commitment to the organisation. Whilst this would be based on the individual’s personal 
motivations, it does potentially appeal to the athlete’s sense of morality; when the 
consequences of one’s actions are limited to one’s self, individuals may be more willing to 
take risks. Similarly, Breivik (1992) analysed doping in sport with reference to the prisoner’s 
dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is basically the idea that in real life situations two 
individuals, even if it might be in their own interests to do so, may not cooperate. That is to 
say self-interest, the pursuit of individual reward and the belief that they will be at a 
disadvantage if they do not act. An athlete’s decision to dope or not is infl uenced by their 
perceptions on the actions of other athletes. If they choose not to dope they may feel that 
they will be at the disadvantage; if they do they are more likely to get benefi t. This concept 
is well supported by a number of athletes following receiving a ban for doping, that they 
felt they needed to dope in order to be competitive because everyone else was also doping 
(Cycling News 2008, 2010b). As such the concept of a ‘pool of responsibility’ removes this 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ issue. 
Somewhat similar is the concept of duress under law. It is the concept that an individual 
performed an act (illegal in nature which they would not normally) due to threat or other 
similar pressure (normally violence) against the person in question. Specifi cally related to 
325POOL OF RESPONSIBILITY
the case of doping, one can refer to contract law. Duress in contract law can take the form 
of economic duress (Hale 1943). It can be therefore argued that in sports doping case, there 
may be situations where athletes are pushed into doping. This pressure may come from 
coaches, managers etc. and as such under such law, it would seem reasonable that the 
athlete have the defence of duress. As such the pool of responsibility concept is further 
reinforced. In such cases where it can be proven that another person is forcing the decision 
making of the athlete, it would seem only fair that they are held liable and so should be 
punished.
2.3. The Case Studies
An analysis of cycling in the context of a ‘pool of responsibility’ can be performed. In the 
event that a single cyclist was detected to have taken a banned substance and subsequently 
banned, the consequences would also be extended to other riders on the team and also 
include coaches, medical practitioners and sports scientists in the team. Exactly what these 
consequences would be would have to be determined, but for example, it would include 
some form of ban for the others involved also. Depending on the sport and the number of 
athletes involved, the level of responsibility would need to be increased to the national level 
simply because anything less and perceived benefi ts of doping may remain greater than the 
perceived consequences of being caught, and as such will not result in a change an athlete’s 
actions. These two concepts, a) athlete’s perceptions, and perhaps more signifi cantly b) the 
cost-risk-ratio are two of the greatest barriers to successful anti-doping legislation. To 
elaborate, under the legislation guiding many current sport disciplines, the consequences of 
a positive test for doping agents are limited to the individual involved. The consequences to 
the organisation, be it national associations, or be it the employer, are limited. Cycling can 
be used again as an example. Under current Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) legislation 
(UCI 2012a; UCI 2012b) the consequence to the team for a doping infringement is fi rstly 
disqualifi cation of the team from the event itself (part 14 s327) (seemingly applied 
randomly) and, secondly, a loss of the world tour points collected by the athlete (part 2, s 
2.15.040). There is no responsibility taken by the team members, coach, or other persons 
involved in the team. No tour points are deducted from the group of riders who should have 
been looking out for other members of the team to ensure that they did not use a banned 
substance. The Alberto Contador Vedasco case provides us with an example. The impact to 
Saxo Bank (his team) was simply that the ban placed upon Contador resulted in a loss of 
the points collected during his ban. The team did not lose its pro team licence. It could be 
said that, given the importance of Contador to Saxo Bank (the fact that he was the captain 
and the ‘protected’ rider), one would expect his suspension to bring signifi cant detrimental 
impacts to the team. Yet the reality is that even in this case, the impact of his suspension 
was far less widespread than one would necessarily think. Saxo Bank still has a pro team 
licence and, in fact in 2013, obtained a new major sponsor/owner, Tinkoff (Cycling News 
2013b). Furthermore, perhaps it could be said that had the concept of a ‘pool of 
responsibility’ been in place during the Lance Armstrong era in cycling (and thus the rule 
applied to the US Postal cycling team), there is a strong possibility that Lance Armstrong 
would not have been able to avoid detection for as long as he did, or perhaps this concept 
may have even prevented doping at the team level altogether. 
Yet another case which demonstrates the ineffectiveness of individual responsibility on 
anti-doping legislation and penalties, (and realistically with the anti-doping legislation 
itself) can be seen with baseballer Jhonny Peralta. Peralta was implicated in the Biogenesis 
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scandal, and as a result of his complicity received a 50 match ban. This in itself seems 
somewhat insignifi cant given the percentage of the baseball season this represents (less than 
1/3 of a single season), hardly impacting the playing career of a professional baseballer. 
What is more, Peralta, upon returning to the sport is reported to be now earning more than 
$50 million US over 4 years. In fact, the end result, in this case, shows that there is 
signifi cant advantage to be had by engaging in doping. If you are not caught then you have 
a successful and lucrative career, and if you are caught then you have a successful and more 
lucrative career upon your return. This thought seems to be shared by a number of other 
baseball players. Brad Ziegler commented “It pays to cheat... Thanks, owners, for 
encouraging PED use” (Ziegler 2013). David Aardsma said “Apparently getting suspended 
for PED’s means you get a raise. What’s stopping anyone from doing it? 
#weneedtomakeachange,” (Aardsma 2013). As a result of the controversial situation 
involving Peralta, the Major League Baseball Players Association made changes to its Joint 
Drug Agreement. The new changes were in a similar vein to the WADA changes; increased 
penalties, as well as some additional restrictions following players’ return after the ban 
(MLBPA 2014). The problem here is that the consequences of the ban are still limited to the 
individual. It remains to be seen if there are additional incentives to discourage doping from 
the team and coaches’ perspective. 
A new approach to anti-doping policy with regards to policing and deterrence is 
needed. Given the current realities of doping in professional sports, the question remains, 
what new regime is required to combat doping?
Table 1:  The number of individual athletes needing to be held responsible if a single athlete 
is detected doped–based on current WADA fi gures.
Sport Number of co-responsible athletes if tests are at 
current level
Air Sports   32
Archery   68
Baseball   50
Bobsleigh 625
Cycling   84
Football 208
Rowing 435
Table 1 depicts the ‘pool of responsibility’ calculated as an inverse of actual adverse 
analytical fi ndings. The concept of the ‘pool of responsibility’ indicates how many other 
individual athletes would need to take responsibility for doping if one were to be discovered 
by a test, provided the current testing regime of anti-doping was to remain. These indications 
are such, that should anti-doping testing remain unchanged (that being chemical testing 
solely), one would all but expect some potential dopers to slip through the cracks. As such, 
legislation may need to be developed to accommodate the reality that anti-doping policies 
as they currently stand fall short of catching all abusers.
The situation which exists in sports today is basically the opposite to the concept of a 
‘pool of responsibility’, basically an ‘inverse pool of responsibility’. As it stands today, 
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teams, coaches, sponsors, managers etc. pressure athletes to ‘achieve at all costs’. This 
sometimes results in doping at which point the responsibility is borne solely by the athlete 
in question, the other involved parties disclaim any responsibility. This can be an effective 
strategy in sports, as doping detections only occur occasionally, whereas the ‘benefi ts’ of 
having a doped athlete can bring signifi cant fi nancial and promotional prestige to the team. 
Therefore, if each athlete is signifi cantly doped (and the chances of detections are still 
small), and the responsibility is confi ned to the individual in question, the benefi ts again 
outweigh the consequences. This creates the perfect environment to promote a culture of 
doping. Such realities have been realised in a number of US sports such as baseball as 
outlined above. 
2.4. The Legal Arena
The concept of individuals taking responsibility when wider responsibility is more 
appropriate is well documented in policing and governmental literature (Wakefi eld–Fleming 
2009). The term ‘responsibilization’ refers to the concept that bodies, such as government 
agencies, pass off responsibility or tasks and duties to individuals. Examples include police 
taking on a range of security and protection roles that were not originally their responsibility, 
or individuals being asked to look out for their own safety when it should be ensured by 
other bodies such as police (Wakefi eld–Fleming 2009). This appears to be the case in sports. 
Athletes have the sole responsibility for doping infractions, even in cases where more 
appropriately wider responsibility is both benefi cial and fairer given the realities of sports. 
There are a number of issues with the responsibilization approach to policing doping. These 
include a) individualising problems with systematic origins (Wakefi eld–Fleming 2009), and 
b) blaming of victims (Wakefi eld–Fleming 2009). To elaborate fi rstly, athletes are made 
solely responsible for doping irrespective of whether or not external factors are infl uencing 
them. One such example can be seen in the Lance Armstrong case, where as it was claimed 
by athletes, cycling had an inherent and pre-existing culture of doping (Albergotti–O’Connell 
2012). As such, external factors clearly play a role. Secondly, given this, athletes may well 
be deemed to be victims of an out of control system, as such they themselves, the victims to 
some extent, are therefore held responsible. Such is the state of professional sports, 
especially given the concept of strict liability, which is applied in cases of doping. 
Introducing a policy of group responsibility and reducing the concept of responsibilization 
would not only theoretically reduce this likelihood of such occurrences and thus prevent 
doping, but would help eliminate some of the unfairness inherent in the sporting world.
A ‘pool of responsibility’ approach provides a great incentive for the team as a whole 
to prevent such events occurring again, and the lack of such incentive may in fact limit the 
level of organisational support provided to combat doping. One may think that the 
consequences of a major doping scandal would have a series of intangible impacts on the 
team (such as a loss of reputation in the face of spectators, fans and potential investors).In 
reality, as the Contador case demonstrates, the popularity of a team (in this case Saxo Bank) 
and the athlete, following such scandals, appears to be potentially even higher. It is not 
always off putting to potential investors. Similar effects have been realised with the case of 
other cyclists including Valverde, Vinokurov, Basso, etc. These effects of increased 
popularity are seemingly realised in cases where there appears to be ambiguity regarding 
the athlete’s intent to dope, yet irrespectively, sanctions are imposed. Spectators may feel 
sorry for such athletes and as such their popularity apparently increases, like with the cases 
outlined above. This in turn would result in a lower desire to abstain from doping as there is 
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little consequence with signifi cant gains. Again, what is the point of anti-doping policies? 
Are they simply to boost revenue (sports are seen as fair and therefore resulting in a greater 
number of spectators), or rather to protect the health of athletes and the fairness of the 
sport? It would appear that in the case of some people it is the former rather than the latter. 
What is more, as demonstrated in the above cases, real world issues associated with sports 
law, anti-doping policies and punishment for infringements, often result in decisions that 
appear to be somewhat hypocritical or varying, depending on the athlete. This may, in many 
cases, be causing more problems in sport than they are rectifying.
The notion of extended responsibility is not an alien concept in law. Under US law 
there is a legal doctrine known as a Toxic Tort. As Henderson defi nes it “Toxic torts are 
defi ned as those in which persons assert causes of action seeking compensation for one or 
more adverse health effects resulting from exposure to one or more toxic substances” 
(Henderson 1990: 69). In essence the responsibility of the injury caused to the plaintiff is 
borne by the defendant, for example pharmaceutical companies. This law dates back to 
1973 with the landmark case Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp and subsequently 
saw the extension to include pharmaceutical companies in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. Diffi culties usually arise in such cases due to two reasons. Firstly, in 
such cases, the plaintiff is required to demonstrate a causal link between the injury and the 
exposure. This often proves diffi cult, as there is often a plethora of other factors which may 
also be argued as either being possible attributors to the injury or simply it is diffi cult to 
prove such a causal link. Secondly, a number of issues arrive with the assessment of 
scientifi c evidence in addition to the assessment of the testimony of the expert witnesses 
(Foster–Bernstein–Huber 1993). No doubt there is contradictory scientifi c evidence relating 
to the exact consequences and relationship between the pharmaceutical (or chemical) and 
the supposed injury. Whilst this may indeed present an issue in civil cases involving 
exposure to potential chemicals, this may present less of a problem in doping cases. This 
can be demonstrated by the ample evidence outlined previously with regards to the harmful 
effects of some doping agents. In fact, one of the primary arguments for the existence of 
anti-doping legislation is for the protection of human health (UNESCO 2005; WADA 
2009). 
In a similar vein to the above outlined legal doctrine, one can fi nd in US law, two 
additional related legal concepts, alternative liability and market-share liability. Both of 
these doctrines see a shift in the concept of strict liability, a broadening of the concept 
(Harvard Law Review 1981). In these situations the burden of proof switches from the 
plaintiff to the defendants. In the case of alternative liability, multiple defendants can be 
held liable even if only one was responsible for the injury. In such situations it is the 
responsibility of the innocent defendant, in a group of defendants, to prove they did not 
cause the injury (Summers v. Tice, 1948). Similarly, market-share liability shifts the burden 
of proof away from the plaintiff and onto the defendant. In this doctrine, manufactures, 
particularly pharmaceutical companies, may be held jointly liable, even if only a single 
defendant caused the injury in question (Sheffet 1983). What makes this doctrine so 
different from a normal tort is that the plaintiff need not know from which defendant the 
injury originated (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 1980), liability is then apportioned to 
manufacturers according to their market share. There are, however, naturally some 
conditions that must be met in order for the principle of market-share liability to be upheld. 
Firstly, a substantial representation of the market must be in the court (the defendants). 
Secondly, the products must be interchangeable. Thirdly, the defendants in question would 
need to be active in the market in the timeframe outlined in the case. Finally, the plaintiff’s 
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inability to assign liability to a specifi c manufacturer must not be their own fault. If one 
were to then apply this to a doping situation it can be demonstrated that it would be feasible. 
A substantial representation of those involved in the sporting arena and directly relating to 
the athlete accused of doping could be obtained. This may include any or all of the 
following; the coaches, managers, medical practitioners, sports scientists, pharmaceutical 
companies and team mates etc. The second and third point would be obvious. The fourth 
could relate to the athlete trusting the doctor or sports scientist to do no harm, or just listen 
to the coach without knowledge of the product injected/used etc. In any case it demonstrates 
that systems of increased responsibility and liability already exist and are accepted as 
legally binding principles. As such, the extension of this notion to the sporting area does not 
seem such a big stretch. Moreover, there were two statements made in the court’s ruling in 
the Sindell case which would seem to be particularly apt and appropriate if applied in a 
sporting situation, 
 “... defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture 
of a defective product” (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 1980: 600),
 “... as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear 
the cost of the injury” (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 1980: 600).
Moreover, perhaps it can be said that the introduction of such a system of anti-doping 
in sports, may also increase the sporting stakeholder’s willingness to actively prevent 
doping, similar to the suggestion by Sheffet (1983: 38) in the Sindell case, ‘such a policy 
will increase manufacturers’ incentives to produce safe products’.
3. ‘POOL OF RESPONSIBILITY’: THE APPLICATION
In practice the application of the theory of a ‘pool of responsibility’ could potentially take 
on many different forms or structures. Obviously there would need to be a level of fl exibility 
in its initial formation. With the introduction of a ‘pool of responsibility’ it is possible that 
the bans for athletes found to be doping could remain at current WADA levels (4 years), 
and simply supplemented with additional consequences. Therefore, whilst there are 
potential alternatives available the suggestions for the application on the principle of a ‘pool 
of responsibility’ are as follows:
1) Always apply UCI rule part 14 s327, if an athlete is found to be doped on a team 
then the whole team needs to be disqualifi ed from the event, not just the athlete in question, 
without exception.
2) Uniformity in sentencing and punishment is needed; ambiguity and unfair decisions 
result in greater long-term problems with regard to doping.
3) Athletes in the team for the last year should be excluded from competition for a 
period. This period may be shorter than the detected athlete, but must still be a period that 
would impact their sporting life, so no benefi t is gained by doping.
4) All coaches who were responsible for the training of the team, for the last year 
before the positive doping detection should face a suspension, for at least as long as the 
athlete in question. If it can be shown that the coach abused the position of trust they were 
in with the athlete, and/or infl uenced the athlete to partake in doping, then the coach in 
question should receive a ban at least double that of the athlete. 
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5) All medical practitioners who for the year prior to the positive doping detection, 
who advised athletes in the team, should face suspension. Again, if it could be shown that 
they abused the position of trust they had with the athlete, and/or advised or infl uenced the 
athlete to dope they should also face deregistration from the medical profession.
6) All sport scientists responsible for advising the team for the year prior to the positive 
doping detection, should face suspension. Again, if it could be shown that they abused the 
position of trust they had with the athlete, and/or advised or infl uenced the athlete to dope 
they should also face a lifetime ban.
As such, the realities of sports are such that decisions athletes make to engage in 
doping rarely are void of others infl uence or participation. The recommendations take into 
consideration these realities, and as such those infl uencing the athlete need to be taken into 
consideration when doping punishment is dealt. Current anti-doping legislation is largely 
ineffective as it stands, this fact is demonstrated by reference to the fact that punishments 
are simply being increased to try and combat it. If it is to remain it needs to be supplemented 
with additional penalties, to make the athletes think twice about doping before they partake. 
The plethora of organisational literature and examples demonstrating the importance and 
benefi ts of group responsibility and autonomy, demonstrate the usefulness of a ‘pool or 
responsibility’ to anti-doping policies. The evidence is signifi cant enough to justify the 
incorporation of a ‘pool of responsibility’ into the current anti-doping legislation. It should 
prove to be more effective when coupled with the current approach. A ‘pool of responsibility’ 
would appear to be the most effective solution given the current anti-doping systems 
(chemical testing and punishment). The benefi ts of such a system should aid in preventing 
doping scandals before they are revealed only years after the occurrences.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall it has been demonstrated that the concept of wider group responsibility; a ‘pool of 
responsibility’ is neither an alien nor illegal concept. Whilst it is considered by some to be 
controversial, it can be found to be used in the military, wider business world and in 
numerous manifestations in the legal arena. It is well documented by athletes, offi cials and 
researchers that the factors infl uencing doping are not as simple as the notion of strict 
liability would have one believe. In most doping cases, external players infl uence and in 
many situations directly contribute to an athlete’s decision to dope. Factors such as pressures 
of the sporting world, coaches and peer pressure, ‘suggestions’ by medical practitioners and 
sports scientists etc. As such does it not seem reasonable that the responsibly and liability of 
an athlete found to have doped is not borne solely by them? For is this not an unfair 
outcome given the sporting realities. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that there are 
numerous examples from the business world that show the plethora of benefi ts that can be 
realised from a group responsibility system. One could hope that in the best case scenario it 
may eliminate doping and continues to maintain the sustainability and excitement that is 
sport.
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